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Abstract  
The article identifies eight groups of either mainly healthy children who 
become child patients, or else mainly ill children who are denied health care. 
The article questions whether children become patients through medical 
diagnosis or economic influences, and seeks to explain seemingly illogical 
international patterns in child health and illness.  
 
Introduction 
This article reviews eight contested meanings of ‘children as patients’ in how 
children are identified and identify themselves as patients. The borderlines 
between health and illness tend to be drawn differently in the minority richer 
world (about 17% of the world’s total population of 6.5 billion) and the majority 
poorer world. Parsons (1951) identified disease as bodily dysfunction, 
whereas being a patient is a social role. The patient or sick role is governed 
by four expectations: exemption from normal role responsibilities; legitimation 
often by a doctor; wanting to get better; and seeking and cooperating with 
technically competent help. Each year, millions of possibly healthy children 
are identified as patients, and millions of sick and dying children are excluded 
from that role, as the following examples illustrate. The eight groups of 
children each raise questions about why they are or are not identified as 
patients.      
   
Brief illness 
The first group is sick children in the minority world who are briefly ill, although 
formerly many of them would have stayed in bed for weeks, followed by 
convalescence and quarantine, to prevent infection spreading to other 
children. Today, the average stay in many paediatric wards lasts less than two 
days. Improved medication to control symptoms and aid rapid recovery has 
reduced fears about cross infection. It has also increased uncertainties about 
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the difference between health and minor illness, and about when a child 
qualifies as a patient. Children who briefly feel unwell, and might hope to 
become patients, exempted from normal school and housework duties, are 
now often sent to school or nursery as usual, with antibiotics.  
  Is it in the children’s interests to be treated as ‘normally healthy’ when they 
have infections and feel unwell and tired? Should they have extra care and 
rest, for their own sake, and to prevent frequent cross infection, especially 
among younger children at centres where colds and tummy bugs regularly 
circulate?     
   
Long term serious illness 
The second group is children living with serious long term and potentially fatal 
conditions, cystic fibrosis or type 1 diabetes, for example. They live in the 
minority world; few survive in the majority world for lack of affordable services. 
Generally they maintain high standards of health and well-being. They attend 
routine healthcare appointments, but seldom see themselves as patients. 
They put great efforts into being ‘normal’, fitting medical routines of diet, 
physiotherapy or insulin injections as unobtrusively as possible into their 
everyday lives and saying ‘I want to be like my friends,’ ‘I just want to get on 
with life’ (Alderson, Sutcliffe and Curtis, 2006). Hundreds of research papers 
have been written on these young people’s ‘non-compliance’ with medical 
regimes (DH and MRC, 2002), basically their reluctance to fit the sick role 
(although they cannot ‘get better’ except in terms of managing symptoms 
more efficiently). Little research attention is paid to the many children who 
share in effectively managing their condition. However, I suggest that ‘non-
compliance’ involves differences between ordinary people’s broad concepts of 
social health and healthcare practitioners’ narrower concepts of physical 
health, when they prescribe higher standards of healthy living than the 
average person would accept. Few adults stick rigidly to advice about diet and 
exercise, smoking or alcohol. They set their ideas of ‘social health’, of ‘having 
fun’, being like their friends, ‘living life to the full’, before their physical health. 
Children and young people with long term conditions face similar conflicts 
when their prescribed very healthy living standards could undermine their 
social and emotional health by excluding them from friendships, fun, parties, 
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carefree spontaneity and, most of all, being accepted and included as a 
normal person. Their physical and social health and survival depend on 
balancing the demands of being a compliant patient with the vital and very 
complex challenges of also being ‘an ordinary person’. Simply to classify them 
as patients misses how they have to manage these contradictions at the 
centre of their daily life and identity. 
  How can these children best be enabled to promote their physical and their 
social and emotional wellbeing?     
   
Sad, bad, mad or ill? 
Until recently, the third group was regarded as within the normal range, or as 
sad, odd, difficult or naughty, but not sick. Now they compose the largest and 
expanding group of minority world child patients (Coppock, 2005). Their 
experiences and behaviours are redefined as forms of sickness requiring 
medical interventions: obesity, shyness, insomnia. Between a quarter and one 
half of ordinary children at United States (US) summer camps ‘jostle for their 
morning medications: Zoloft for depression, Ablify for bipolar disorder, 
Guanfacine for twitchy eyes and a host of medications for attention deficit 
disorder’, some have a cocktail of drugs to treat hyperactivity, anxiety and 
depression (Gross, 2006). Only in the US and New Zealand can these drug 
be advertised directly to parents. A graphic example of children’s enforced 
patient-hood is when they are unwillingly but ‘voluntarily’ admitted to mental 
hospital by their parents’ agreement, although not their own. Then they lack 
even the rights held by patients whose admission is enforced by the state. 
During a conference in 2007, US and UK paediatricians, all mainly dealing 
with general problems, not hospital specialists, discussed how they now 
encounter broadly social rather than medical problems: emotional and 
behavioural difficulties, obesity, school and other social exclusions, violence 
and child abuse, dysfunctional families, self-harm and attempted suicide, drug 
misuse, teenage pregnancy. A survey of child health and well-being in 21 rich 
countries (UNICEF, 2007b) took six main measures: material well-being; 
health and safety; educational well-being; family and peer relations (trust, ‘just 
talking with parents’, ‘kind and helpful peers’); health and risk behaviours 
(smoking, drinking); violence; and subjective well-being (feeling healthy, liking 
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school, personal satisfaction). Two of the wealthiest countries, the UK and the 
US, had the worst results. The paediatricians described feeling uncertain and 
helpless about how to adapt social problems into the medical model of 
identifying clinical conditions and their causes, in order to prevent, alleviate 
and cure disease. ‘General paediatrics has lost its way’ commented one 
doctor. To call all the children in this third group ‘patients’, who are implicitly 
best served by healthcare practitioners and treatments, can confirm 
questionable medicalising assumptions. Research with children being treated 
for mental distress finds that they do not want to be patholgised, they want 
services that respect and listen and respond to children’s own views and 
definitions of mental distress and need, with fewer drug treatments and more 
peer support (Laws, 1998). 
  Are medical treatments and medication effective and appropriate treatments 
for many of these social conditions? Or are they palliation to suppress 
symptoms? Do they divert attention away from social and economic problems, 
their causes and prevention, in ways that harm rather than benefit children?         
   
Severe and fatal illness in the majority world 
Fourth and conversely, millions of majority world children who are severely ill 
and in urgent need of medical treatment have no hope of becoming patients in 
terms of receiving diagnoses and formal healthcare. UNICEF (2002, 2007a) 
estimates that each year 40 to 50 million newborn children are not registered 
by the state and are therefore not entitled to any state services. An estimated 
.37 billion have no access to professional health care. Many families cannot 
afford to pay for healthcare and, even in the US, 40 to 50 million people 
including children do not have health insurance. Globally, each year up to ten 
million children aged under 5 years die; 53,000 children die from homicide; up 
to a third of children are severely beaten at home with implements; 150 million 
girls and 73 million boys are raped or violently sexually abused (UN, 2006). 
Hazardous child labour and slavery jeopardise child health. It is estimated that 
there are almost 5,000 child ‘sex slaves’ trafficked into the UK (Craig et al., 
2007). Migration of health care staff away from poorer countries means that 
this fourth group of children are still less likely to be treated as patients. ‘There 
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are more nurses from Malawi in Manchester than in Malawi and more doctors 
from Ethiopia in Chicago than in Ethiopia’ (Khor, 2006).  
  Crucially relevant to ‘children as patients’ are basic services and standards 
to help to prevent them from becoming ill. Yet one in six people in the world 
does not have clean safe water; one in three has inadequate sanitation. 
Malnutrition results in the illness, disability and death of countless children: 
almost half a billion children suffer severe hunger and 100 million young 
children have vitamin A deficiency, a major cause of blindness, illness and 
death (UNICEF, 2007a). High maternal mortality rates increase infant 
morbidity and mortality. Armed conflicts mainly occur in urban areas and 
begin by damaging local sanitation and health services. Along with enforced 
migration, floods, droughts and hurricanes, conflicts increase each year the 
numbers of children with severe physical and psychological illness and injury. 
In January 2008, half a million people are expected to be made homeless by 
huge floods in Southern Africa. Tropical diseases are spreading into the 
southern Europe and into southern US where they affect many Black and 
Hispanic children who cannot access health services. The local anxieties of 
paediatricians about children in group three escalate to a global scale for 
children in group four, challenging governments and international aid 
agencies (UNICEF, 2007a; Monbiot, 2007). Pharmaceutical research relating 
to children as patients reinforces these inequalities by investing mainly in 
medication to treat minority world children, and investing far less in treatments 
for the diseases that kill and disable most children – tuberculosis, malaria, 
which infects 500 million people each year, and other tropical infections. 
  Why do healthcare services and research attend so much more to the 
broadly healthy minority world children, and so much less to majority world 
children in greatest need?  
 
Symptoms without signs  
Fifth is the small but challenging group of children who feel very ill, with 
nausea, severe pain, exhaustion and incapacity, but whose doctors refuse to 
recognise them as ill because they have no identifiable medical sign, for 
example, no abnormal hormone, blood count, anatomy and x-ray or scan 
profile, or gene. Conditions such as chronic fatigue syndrome and myalgic 
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encephalopathy (ME) raise debates about whether these are real or imagined 
illness, and they illustrate further complications of the sick role. To become a 
patient, it is not enough to suffer extreme and prolonged symptoms. Doctors 
look for an accepted sign to legitimate illness. Also, the sick role duty of 
‘cooperating with technically competent help’ (Parsons, 1951) requires 
effective help with which to cooperate, but so far treatments for ME are mainly 
ineffective or highly controversial. Children in this fifth group highlight a 
paradox when doctors refuse to accept them as patients, whereas doctors do 
accept countless children from group three, who also tend to have no clinical 
signs and in addition often lack symptoms of pain, nausea and inertia.  
  Why do doctors insist on finding a clinical sign before they diagnose certain 
illnesses with severe symptoms, but readily diagnose other ‘illnesses’ that 
have neither signs nor symptoms of physical illness?  
   
Screening and scanning 
The sixth group is the mainly healthy general majority world populations who 
undergo medical screening. Screening is an initial broad sweep to find the few 
who may be potential patients, who will have further tests. Usually, screening 
is for older age groups, to help practitioners to give them informed advice on 
healthy lifestyles, or to offer treatment for cancer and other ailments. In 
contrast, the other routine screening and scanning is prenatal, when the main 
‘treatment’ offered is not lifestyle options but termination of pregnancy if the 
fetus is impaired or, in some societies, female. Preconception screening aims 
to identify prospective parents who carry genetic conditions, and in vitro 
fertilisation (IVF) may involve checking and selecting embryos before they are 
implanted into a uterus. Prenatally, ‘children as patients’ extends to include 
the fetus and even the IVF embryo because of emphases in prenatal services 
associated with modern childhood that potentially influence child-parent 
relationships well before birth: risk, anxiety about imperfection and failure to 
fulfil potential, reliance on medical information and technology (Alderson, 
2002). Parents’ decisions may depend on whether they relate to the fetus as a 
person, a patient, ‘nobody’, or a commodity (Williams, Alderson and Farsides, 
2001).  
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  An unusual example of screening, which brings direct benefit, is when all 
newborn babies are checked for phenylketonuria, and treatment begins 
immediately to prevent severe learning difficulties from developing. However 
another neonatal screening, for cystic fibrosis when earlier detection and 
treatment before symptoms develop might improve health and survival rates, 
raises ethical questions, along with other genetic screening (Clarke and 
Ticehurst, 2007). Should children be tested or informed, when no prevention 
or cure can be offered, and when the condition (Huntington’s Chorea, breast 
cancer) might not develop until decades later? If children are found to be 
carriers of genetic conditions, when they will not have cystic fibrosis, for 
example, but might pass it on to their children, when should parents and 
children be informed?  
  So-far unresolved controversies are associated with almost all screening. 
Are screening costs recouped by outcomes in terms of healthier lives and 
disabled lives prevented? Are scarce practitioners better employed in 
screening or in treatment services? In Britain there are serious shortages of 
midwives in labour wards but growing use of midwives in prenatal screening. 
Does earlier detection and treatment, even for some cancers, produce better 
outcomes? Is the unnecessary anxiety aroused in the healthy majority, who 
may become the ‘worried well’, justified? Why do so many people ignore life-
style advice based on screening results? In January 2008, vast plans to 
increase screening in the hope of reducing illness were announced by 
government in London. Childhood obesity is just one example. However, 
screening can be counterproductive. Advice on diet, exercise and other 
healthy habits is similar for preventing many health problems so that it is often 
not necessary to screen in order to identify a particular potential problem. Yet 
if one is detected, people may feel that there is little they can do and that they 
might as well enjoy a shorter merry and unhealthy life. Alternatively, if they are 
told that there have no potential problems, they may see no reason to stop 
unhealthy habits. Anxiety when feeling that they should change tends to 
induce fat people to have another doughnut, and smokers to light another 
cigarette.  
  Why is so much being invested in costly screening services for mainly 
healthy populations, which does not benefit most children, can harm many 
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(female feticide), and takes funding and staff away from under-resourced 
treatment services? 
   
Disabled children  
Group seven is disabled children, when medical services cannot cure or 
alleviate their physical, sensory or learning difficulties. While valuing medical 
services to treat illness, disabled academics have questioned medical 
‘management’ of disability. They contrast the medical with the social model of 
disability (Oliver, 1990), although Shakespeare (2007) has modified this 
distinction. They criticise the misuse of medical services and time, and the 
risks of arousing false hopes of a cure. They argue that instead of reducing 
disability, the medical model can increase is worst aspects, stigma and 
exclusion: by identifying and trying to treat the problem within the individual 
child; by keeping the child and family dependent on healthcare practitioners 
and on separate ‘special’ services; by constantly comparing the child’s failings 
against ‘normal’ standards; and by generally expecting disabled children to 
play the sick role but without hope of recovery. There are medical debates, for 
example, about whether repeated operations for children who have spina 
bifida or cerebral palsy might increase their infections, pain and immobility 
and do more harm than good. In contrast, the social model identifies disabling 
factors not in the child’s impairments but in the barriers and negative attitudes 
of an uncaring society. Special services are replaced by inclusive mainstream 
ones where disabled and non-disabled children live and learn together 
(Alderson and Goodey, 1998); by assuring access to public buildings and 
transport; by overcoming negative discriminating attitudes; by respecting and 
valuing children for themselves, rather than for their performance or 
‘normality’. Most crucially, the child is regarded as a person, not a patient, and 
disabilities are not seen as personal medical problems but as political and 
economic challenges, which disabled and non-disabled children and adults 
work together to change.  
  In many countries, despite far more inclusive and accessible amenities for 
disabled people to share with everyone else, and despite years of research 
about the social and medical models, why are so much staffing, funding and 
resources still devoted to medical model services for disabled children?     
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Children in research 
Finally, medical research can draw strange boundaries between supposed 
child ‘patients’ and ‘non-patients’. For example, many children with asthma 
use inhalers for daily prophylaxis (to prevent rather than treat asthma attacks). 
If they stop using inhalers, they are likely to react for days or weeks by having 
more attacks. If the children take part in randomised controlled trials, they 
may be ‘patients’ in a treatment arm, or they may be in the arm, which has 
inhalers containing placebo (dummy or non-treatment). In effect they stop 
being patients when they no longer have treatment, although for all they know 
they may be reacting to the new drug rather than to having a non-drug. Logic, 
ethics, and concern for the children’s safety, would suggest that the best trials 
compare a new treatment against a known treatment, unless there is not yet 
an accepted treatment but there are many for asthma. It also seems obviously 
unscientific to compare the effectiveness of a drug against non-treatment of a 
group of children who are having severe withdrawal reactions after their usual 
medication is suddenly withheld. Surely that would give an unfair misleading 
advantage to the new drug. However, the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA), the US agency resonsible for medical research, prefers placebo trials 
(Ross, 2006). British ethical guidance (RCPCH, 2000) insists that children 
should be involved in medical research only if the research cannot equally 
well be done on adults, and if the findings are intended to benefit chidlren. US 
guidance does not have this standard, so that children are recruited simply to 
increase numbers of subjects in trials, but with no guarantee that they will be 
studied as a separate group in order to benefit future child patients (Ross, 
2006). Despite bioethics safeguards, harmful research and practice scandals 
continue to be reported (Kennedy, 2001; Redfern, 2001), the exploitation of 
children in psycho-pharmaceutical research (Sharav, 2003; Coppock, 2005; 
Baughman, 2006) and the use of dangerous experimental drugs on African 
children (Save the Children, 2007). The are regular debates in medical 
journals about commercial interests, which distort research funding and 
agendas, bioethics committee judgements and peer reviewing for journals.     
  Why does dangerous and unscientific medical research continue to be 
conducted on children despite decades of critical reports and guidelines?  
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Discussion 
Doctors appropriately diagnose and effectively treat many children. However, 
instead of a clear straight line between health and illness, wildly shifting 
boundaries place many extremely sick children in the ‘non-patient’ zones, and 
many children who are healthy, or who perceive themselves as healthy, in the 
‘patient’ zones, in seemingly arbitrary and illogical ways. Scambler (2002) 
criticises social researchers for spending too much time on collecting and 
reporting surface appearances and associations (such as poor health indices 
and behaviours) and too little time on searching for deeper realities and 
explanations, the spider that is spinning the web. Visible health data are like 
countless falling objects; research about them means little unless they are 
connected to the invisible forces and influences that explain the falling, for 
example, gravity.  
  The driving force and common explanation about child health and illness 
appears to be economics. Douthwaite (1999), Stiglitz (2002), Scambler 
(2002), with many others, analyse how current economic theories massively 
increase poverty and ill health when prosperity and productivity are the 
priorities. These are assumed to flourish in regimes of low taxes, and low 
income and benefits (for workers and young families), with deregulation, high 
profits for industry, and immense wealth for business leaders, which is 
supposed to ‘trickle down’ to benefit all, but fails to do so. Instead, growing 
inequalities between the wealthy few and the many poor are major indices of 
increasing child poverty and ill health (Pickett and Wilkinson, 2007). During 
the 1990s and despite increasing global prosperity, 100 million more people 
were reduced to living in poverty (Stiglitz, 2002:5). For the poorer 50 per cent 
of British people, their share of the national wealth fell from 10 per cent in 
1986 to 5 per cent by 2002. Over half the children in inner London live in 
relative poverty, and nearly 90,000 are homeless or in temporary 
accommodation. They have up to 25 per cent higher risk of severe ill-health 
and disability and are up to four times more likely to suffer mental health 
problems than other children (Mitchell 2006). Governments’ main aims include 
increasing their Gross National Product (GNP). But along with the ‘goods’, 
such as healthcare and housing, costly ‘bads’ also increase the GNP: dealing 
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with accidents, illness, pollution and disasters. Above certain poverty levels, 
paradoxically, a rising GNP involves steady increases in the ‘bads’ of infant 
mortality, child abuse and poverty, teenage suicides, drug use and mental 
illness (Douthwaite, 1999).   
   Economists’ replies to the above eight questions would include the 
following.  
1. Better medication reduces childhood illness and infection, enabling 
slightly ill children to attend to school and parents to go to work and 
increase the GNP instead of staying at home nursing children.   
2. With cystic fibrosis and diabetes, it is more cost-effective to maintain 
current health and education systems than to attempt to retrain all 
practitioners in new emancipatory ways of working with children to 
promote their physical, social and emotional well being.  
3. It is quickest, cheapest, easiest and most profitable for industry and 
therefore the GNP, to treat so called ‘social problems’, the failings of 
inadequate people, with medication, economists would reply. Doctors 
are reluctant to become ‘political’ and to admit that they are attempting 
to treat social and not medical problems. However a critical economics 
analysis would indicate that political remedies are needed: 
redistributing wealth, alleviating poverty and reducing inequalities 
(Scambler, 2002; Pickett and Wilkinson 2007).  
4. The industries running healthcare services and research attend so 
much more to the broadly much healthier minority world children, and 
so much less to majority world children, because profits are made in 
the minority world, and losses in the majority world.  
5. Doctors insist on finding a clinical sign before they diagnose certain 
illnesses with severe symptoms, if there are no available effective 
drugs. They readily diagnose and even construct other ‘illnesses’ 
without signs or symptoms when profitable drugs can be prescribed.  
6. Similarly, screening and scanning services, that may offer little benefit, 
may harm children, and may withdraw resources from treatment 
services, are installed when the providers can profit and persuade 
governments to buy or hire the equipment and services.   
7. The second reply also applied to disabled children.  
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8. Dangerous and unscientific medical research continues to be funded, 
to be approved by ethics committees and peer-reviewers, to be 
published and implemented because all these processes and systems, 
including the FDA, are so heavily funded by the pharmaceutical 
companies, supported by governments whose main concern is to back 
profitable industry. The current privatising of former state hospitals and 
health services (Pollock, 2004), with its immense threat to child health, 
is too large a topic for this article.   
In conclusion, children become patients when adults (parents, governments, 
insurers) are willing and able to pay for their treatment, and when it is 
profitable for companies to sell treatments. Sick children are denied their 
rights (Alderson, 2008) and the status of patient for economic rather than 
medical reasons. Children’s lives, so precious to their family and community, 
may not count, in global policy terms, as worth even the cheapest healthcare.    
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